Merits to integrating JCF and ISCF

Published: The Gleaner (Jamaica)Monday | June 8, 2009

The recent announcement by Minister Nelson about the Government's proposal to establish a reserve force is welcome news. The proposal, while not new, is, it would seem, driven by our present-day reality: the need to have in place a genuine reserve force. This would, at least to my mind, replace the Island Special Constabulary Force (ISCF) as the reserve force, and lead to the eventual integration of both the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) and the ISCF.

Some persons may differ with me on the last point, and argue that the Island Special Constabulary Force is the reserve force of the country, and that there is no need for another. However, while in law the ISCF may be the reserve force, in practice, that is a different matter.

Untidy and untenable situation

Based on what has happened over the years, the ISCF has been operating as a parallel force to the Jamaica Constabulary Force. The ISCF has been allowed over the years to operate in areas managed by the JCF, and in other instances, on their own, and I must say, generally with distinction. However, many experts and laypersons have commented that this is an untidy and untenable situation. The Hurst Report, which was a management audit of the police done in the 1990s, identified this problem and called for the integration of both forces in order to end the duplication of services. This was never done, at least, to the extent that was recommended in the report.

Instead, the then government, seemly lacking the political will, opted for what was termed a rationalisation, which in reality was a just a move to increase the manpower of the JCF.

Increase in manpower

Since then, we have seen the ISCF increase its manpower, reorganise its management structure, and along with a renewed emphasis on training, improve its quality of service. However, no matter how one looks at it, we are still faced with two forces operating side by side, with no clear distinction to the common man in the street. Therefore, the question begs to be asked, can we, as a nation, afford two separate forces operating side by side and offering virtually the same services?

While there may be other reasons for the Government's proposal in wanting to establish a genuine reserve force, such as counteracting the possible withdrawal of service by the different police groups at any one time, there can be no denying the fact that the properly constituted reserve force - ISCF - at this point in time, has moved beyond that role. Therefore, an examination of its operations and considerations for its integrating with the JCF should be done.

Notwithstanding the possible government motive behind the push for another reserve force, the merits to an integration of both the ISCF and the JCF should be considered.

I am, etc.,
MARK BENNETT

Police strategy needs strong support

NOTE-WORTHY: Police strategy needs strong support

published: The Gleaner (Jamaica) Monday January 7, 2008


Against the backdrop of a loud clamouring for strong and decisive action from the government to deal with the rising crime rate, Rear Admiral Lewin, in taking up the post of police commissioner, has cautioned the public against expecting a quick fix.


Commissioner Lewin has pointed out that the cause of crime is multidimensional and as such requires a multidimensional approach. This position is quite different from some among us who believe that only strong police interventions (special squads), and the curtailing of some civil liberties are the answers to our crime problems. Anyone who is familiar with our history would know these approaches to a large extent have been tried before without much success.
While not stating that the police's success in tackling the crime problem will be solely dependent on other efforts at improving the socio-economic situation in the country backed by the necessary political will, he the commissioner has correctly identified the players in this crime-fighting effort and their roles.


Familiar move


The commissioner for his part has stated in a limited manner his vision/strategy which calls for an attack on corruption within the force, development of authority to area commanders, greater accountability and greater integration of community policing philosophy in the operations of the force. This approach seems like a move from the playbook of the New York Police Department during Mayors Dinkins and Giuliani's time. During those periods, the then Commissioners William Bratton and Howard Safir moved the police service from a reactive mode where they were focusing on things like improving response times, clear-up rates to a proactive state, where crime reduction was the primary measure of police effectiveness.


In terms of policing strategies, I submit that in order for the good commissioner to have even a modicum of success, there must be an increase in manpower in the short and medium terms. He must have the ability to hold senior officers accountable (to discipline including dismissal) and to restore trust and confidence in the police. He must also have the support of the political directorate. After all, this was a key component of the successful NYPD model.


I am, etc.,
MARK BENNETT
presbent@yahoo.com